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Abstract:     
 This paper presents the results of a 2003 national survey of urban water 
pricing structure implemented by 429 district level water utilities. After 
providing some background elements on the diversity of existing water 
pricing structures, the paper shows how each structure can be used to 
achieve different management objectives (water allocation efficiency, costs 
recovery, and equity). It then describes the structures adopted by French 
water utilities, showing that flat rate are rarely adopted; declining blocks 
frequently used; and increasing blocks pricing which should be used to 
promote water use efficiency remain extremely rare. A statistical clustering 
is then conducted and a typology of situations elaborated. The paper 
concludes with highlighting that current pricing structures are influenced by 
past practices and that the dominant objective of water utilities is to cover 
costs. 
Keywords:     France; survey; water pricing; tariff; urban 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In many regions of Europe, water is increasingly scarce, as water 
demand goes up and pollution reduces available resources. 
Simultaneously, the cost of producing drinking water rises, as water has 
to be transported over longer distances and/or to be treated at a cost which 
has been continuously rising over the last two decades – in particular due 
to the cost of removal of nitrates and pesticides and the strengthening of 
quality standards. In response to these changes, water is now clearly 
perceived as an economic good which should be charged to users in order 
to provide economic incentives to save it (efficiency objective), to 
recover direct and indirect costs related to its production (cost recovery 
objective), taking into account equity considerations and constraints of 
administrative and political feasibility (for an illustration of the political 
dimension see (Dinar, 2000)). This principle has now been incorporated 
in European legislation with the promulgation of the European Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) of October 23rd 2000 which aims at 
restoring good ecological status for all European waters. Concerning 
water pricing, the WFD promotes (without imposing) the principle of full 
cost recovery, requiring that the beneficiaries of water services should 
provide an “adequate contribution” to the recovery of the direct costs as 
well as for environmental and resource costs they generate (Brouwer and 
Strosser, 2004). The WFD also requires that pricing policies be used to 
provide adequate incentives for consumers to use water resources 
efficiently, clearly calling for a change of practice in terms of water price 
level and water pricing structures (European Commission, 2000). 
An abundant literature focuses on the analysis of the impact of water 
price level on water use decisions, mainly through econometric 
techniques which aim at assessing the price elasticity of urban water 
demand (for a review see Arbués et al., 2003). Most of these studies 
generally assume a simple two-part pricing structure (fixed part plus 
volumetric price) neglecting that water utilities charge users with very 
different and sometimes sophisticated approaches. Significant research 
has also been carried out to analyse the impact of water pricing structure 
on water use efficiency, cost recovery and equity, relying on both 
theoretical and on case studies (Howe and Linaweaver, 1967, Dinar, 
2000). However, relatively little attention has been paid to the factors 
which determine in practice the choice of a pricing structure by local 
water utilities. This issue is of particular importance in countries like 
France, where drinking water networks are owned by several thousands 
(usually public) water utilities, each one defining its own pricing policy, 
taking into account various local constraints. Better understanding this 
diversity of practice is considered as a prerequisite to any policy 
recommendation or action at the national in that domain.  
This paper presents an attempt to fill this gap through a description of 
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the diversity of existing water pricing structure in the drinking water 
sector in France, using primary data collected in 2003. The first section of 
the paper provides some theoretical background elements, highlighting 
that the choice of water pricing structures is often guided by 
considerations of equity, cost recovery and resource use efficiency – three 
management objectives which can be contradictory. The second section 
then describes existing pricing structures in France, based on a national 
survey done in 2003. This data set is then analysed to highlight the factors 
which explain the choice of water pricing structures.  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
When setting water prices, water utilities are following multiple and 
sometimes contradictory management objectives (OECD, 1987, 
Dalhuisen and Nijkamp, 2002, Arbués, et al., 2003): efficiency, which 
consists in allocating water to users to maximise social welfare; equity, 
which in this paper has the same meaning as fairness or poverty 
alleviation, and consists in guaranteeing a minimum access to all (Dinar, 
et al., 1997, Lant, 2004); and costs recovery which consists in balancing 
revenues from users with direct (and sometimes indirect) costs induced 
by water extraction, purification and distribution: in other words, the full 
cost to recover comprises the full supply cost (operation and maintenance 
cost and capital charges) plus the opportunity cost and economic and 
environmental externalities (Rogers, et al., 2002, Lant, 2004). Other 
secondary objectives, which can be more interpreted as constraints, are 
also present: a pricing structure which must be simple to be 
understandable, be acceptable to be applied, guarantee public wealth, etc. 
(OECD, 1987). 
Most water utility managers actually try to achieve three main 
objectives simultaneously, although the relative weight of given to each 
one may vary depending on the social, economic and environmental 
context. This section shows how different pricing structures can be used 
to achieve these three main objectives. 
2.1. Description of water pricing structures 
Water is priced according to a generic function: B = aX + b, with B, 
the total bill, X the water consumption level (in m3), a the price per unit 
of water used; b the fixed part. 
The proportional part (a) can be either constant whatever the level of 
water consumption or priced “per block”. The block pricing can then 
increase with the consumption level (increasing block rate) or decrease 
(declining block rate). Complex pricing structures combining increasing 
and declining steps can also be met. 
The fixed part (b) can be charged in very different ways: it can consist 
in a flat rate charged uniformly to all customer, independently from their 
characteristics (the same amount is charged to a single household living 
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in a detached house and to the owner of a 10 apartments building owner); 
the amount of the fixed part can also be indexed on the number of flats 
connected to the same meter, the number of inhabitants, the size of the 
apartment, the duration of the stay, the number of taps, etc. In some cases, 
the fixed charge is made partly proportional to the volume of water used 
(4 € for each block of 20 m3 consumed for instance).  
Three main types of water pricing can be then found. If a = 0, the 
water bill does not change with water consumption level: it is a flat rate 
structure; if b = 0, the water bill is strictly proportional to water 
consumption: it is a volumetric rate structure; if “a” and “b” are strictly 
positive, it is a two-part rate structure. 
2.2. Households sensitivity to water pricing structure 
The link between water pricing structures and the level of achievement 
of some objectives depends in particular on the type of price toward 
which households are sensitive. For some authors (Gottlieb, 1963, 
Young, 1973, Foster and Beattie, 1979, Shin, 1985), consumers react to 
the average price because information is costly (Shin, 1985): they are 
supposed to be uninformed on the water pricing structure, to not know 
when they change of block, etc. For others (Howe and Linaweaver, 1967, 
Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1991, Lyman, 1992, Nieswiadomy, 1992), 
consumers react to the marginal price.  
But some studies revealed more complicated behaviours: a research 
conducted in Denton (Texas) between 1976 and 1985 on 101 households 
(Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1991, Nieswiadomy, 1992, Taylor, et al., 
2004) showed that behaviours are different if block rates are increasing or 
declining. Water consumers seem to be sensitive to marginal price when 
block rates increase, and to average price when they decrease. A median 
option was initiated by Nordin (Nordin, 1976) for two-part tariffs: he 
assumes that consumers react at both marginal and average prices.  
In the rest of the paper, it is assumed that households are sensitive to 
marginal water price – an assumption allowing us to link water pricing 
structures to the three main objectives previously cited.  
2.3. Which pricing structure for which management 
objectives? 
Because water pricing structures are complex, it is impossible to have 
a strict relation between one structure and one objective. But we can point 
out several trends taking into account the two dimensions of water pricing 
structures (Figure 1).  
When the dominant objective is efficiency, the water supply manager 
will generally charge water with a volumetric rate structure or with a two-
part rate structure where the fixed part represents a small percentage of 
the average water consumption (120 m3 per household per year in 
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France). It can also use increasing block rate to reflect the increasing 
marginal production cost and to stimulate efficiency gains; if a1 and a2 are 
two block prices, the higher is the ratio [(a2-a1)/a1], the more efficient is 
the pricing policy - if we assume that water users are sensitive to water 
price, espacially if the price increase is high (Pouquet and Ragot, 1997).  
Block pricing can also be chosen for equity reasons, the first block 
corresponding to basic needs being free of charge or charged at a very 
low price for social reasons. However block pricing may also have 
adverse effects, in particular if there are shared connections and then no 
metered private water connection (Whittington, 1992). Moreover, it is 
sometimes difficult to dimension the first block at the right size, because 
the social water need depends on the household size (Boland and 
Whittington, 2000). 
When cost recovery is the main objective, the fixed part will represent 
a significant share of the average bill (a*120+b) to secure revenues; the 
manager can also use declining block pricing to maximise its water sales 
by inciting users to consume water. This type of structure is however not 
equitable, small consumers pay a much higher average price than large 
consumers – unless a special tariff is designed for specific segments of 
the society.  
 
Figure 1. Water pricing structures and management objectives  
In practice, the widely used two part rate structure is an intermediate 
way to reach partly the three objectives according to the weight of each 
part (Feldstein, 1972). For example, the cost recovery and the efficiency 
objectives could be attained with a specific structure as: a heavy flat part 
combined with an increasing proportional part with a free first part or 
very low (fixed to cover essential needs or “normal” needs) and a second 
part really high in order to dissuade households to consume more. 
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3. URBAN WATER PRICING STRUCTURE IN 
FRANCE: RESULTS OF A 2003 SURVEY 
Let’s now look at the French water pricing structure situation, 
analysed through a survey conducted in 2003 at the national level. A 
questionnaire (four pages) was mailed to 1630 French districts selected 
following a stratified sampling procedure (taking into account three types 
of factors: geographic, population size, level of seasonal population). It 
was structured to collect information on the characteristics of water and 
wastewater management utility, the detailed water bill, and the eventual 
existence of pricing specificities. The response rate was 29%, with 429 
responses totally exploitable. The results were adjusted to be fully 
representative of the French situation. 
3.1. Water pricing levels  
The average price in France in 2003 is 2.64 €/m3 (Table 1). However, 
there is high different level of prices, in particular because 39% of French 
districts have no collective sewerage and do not price it. 
In this average price, VAT and Water Agencies taxes are included. 
The “polluter pays” and “user pays” principles are indeed two key 
principles underlying the French Water law of 1992 (amended in 2005 to 
comply with the WFD): taxes are is systematically charged to users and 
polluters, and their level are proportional to the volumes of water 
abstracted and consumed or pollution loads discharged in rivers. The 
financial revenues of these taxes are then used to finance actions and 
projects aiming at improving the status of water resources. It is however 
not clear if these taxes are proportional to environmental and resource 
costs generated by those who pay them. Only one study has actually 
addressed this issue (Fredefon and Laurans, 2004), suggested that cost 
recovery level is significantly lower than estimated above if 
environmental and resource costs are taken into account.  
French Water Agencies try to apply the Polluter Payer Principle and 
the User Payer Principle: they tax users for their water extraction, their 
water consumption and their water pollution at a level depending on 
water scarcity and on the generated pollution. However, these taxes do 
not cover, nowadays, all economic and environmental costs (Fredefon 
and Laurans, 2004). 
On average, the fixed part is 31 euros for the water part (equivalent to 
a consumption of 29 cubic meters) and 11 euros for the sewerage part (14 
cubic meters consumed). This law level is mainly explained by the fact 
that sewerage is principally priced with a volumetric rate. 
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Table 1. Average French water price in 2003 
3.2. Overview of existing pricing structures  
In the large majority of cases (for 94% of French districts 
corresponding to 93% of French population), water is charged with a two-
part structure. The volumetric rate is only found in 3% of French districts 
(representing 6% of the population). The flat rate structure remains 
anecdotal, concerning only 3% of French districts (rural), which hardly 
represents a few per mile of the population. 
The fixed part corresponds, on average, of the price of 23 cubic meters 
(b/a = 23). This average ratio is higher (b/a = 46) in districts without 
collective sewerage (and also smaller). 
















Table 2. Distribution of the types of the volumetric part (for water and sewerage 
services) 
Proportional water part (always including, except for districts with no 
water meters, the different Water Agencies taxes) charged to users is 
constant in 57% of the districts, corresponding to more than 70% of the 
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population (Table 2). Surprisingly 36% of the districts use declining 
block tariff structure and only 1% (5% of the population) an increasing 
block structure. Declining block rate is especially found in small districts 
where it is probably implemented to maximise sales and to secure cost 
recovery. An additional 3% of French districts have a price structure 
more complex, combining increasing and declining block rates. 
We have described above the total bill (corresponding to both drinking 
water and sewerage services). This bill is strongly influenced by the 
“drinking water” part (Table 3). The sewerage part, for the 61% of 
districts which have a collective sewerage, is priced in a different way. 
This difference is particularly high in terms of population: when it exists, 
sewerage is priced with a volumetric rate for 68% of French inhabitants.  



























Table 3. Distribution of rate structure for drinking water and sewerage separately 
Moreover, the constant rate structure dominates for sewerage part 
(83% of districts, 91% of inhabitants) and a block rate structure is an 
exception (7% of districts and inhabitants). But flat rate is a bit more 
utilised than for “drinking water” part, concerning 9% of French districts 
(and 2% of population).  
A part this structure, some specificities can be highlighted: one third 
of districts have special pricing structures (mostly declining) for 
industries; one third of districts proposes a special “green” tariff if 
households take a specific water meter for outdoor uses (which do not 
discharge waste water, then sewerage part is not priced); finally, 15% of 
districts put a sewerage flat rate to households who have their own water 
(groundwater through tube-wells or rainwater), because they do not 
consume supplied water but discharge waste water in the sewerage 
system. 
3.3. A typology of French urban water pricing structures 
A cluster analysis (using Ward method) was carried out to make a 
typology of districts homogeneous in terms of pricing structure. A 
partition of the sample into six groups was to be the most relevant one, 
pricing structures differing mainly one from another according to district 
sizes and to the seasonal population level (which conducts to oversize 
water and wastewater infrastructures) (Table 4).  
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 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Total 
Average population (inhabitants) 921 3389 526 5146 21400 209800 14994 
% of districts with high seasonal 
population 14% 43% 37% 9% 11% 0% 28% 
% of district with sewerage service 0% 88% 54% 100% 100% 100% 70% 
Proportional part        
Simple 73% 45% 52% 61% 82% 83% 58% 
Increasing block 0% 7% 2% 12% 5% 13% 5% 
Declining block 27% 32% 36% 18% 5% 4% 28% 
Complex 0% 14% 2% 9% 8% 0% 5% 
Flat rate 0% 1% 9% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
Fixed part         
% of districts with fixed part = 0 0% 0% 4% 3% 13% 9% 4% 
Fixed part (in euros) 57 103 59 42 33 23 61 
       (in % of the bill) 27% 31% 33% 13% 10% 7% 26% 
       (in equivalent of cubic meters 
consumed) 50 61 63 23 17 11 48 
Proportional price        
Average price (euros/cubic meter) 1.8 2.9 1.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.2 
Table 4. Characteristics and pricing structure for the 6 districts types identified 
through cluster analysis.  
As presented in Table 4, the main objective underlying the choice of a 
pricing structure is clearly cost recovery for districts of types 1, 2 and 3 
which are small (less than 500 inhabitants or medium size districts (500 
to 2000) and often facing a high seasonal population rate (respectively 
43% and 37% for districts of types 2 and 3). These districts have a 
relatively high fixed part which represents respectively 27%, 31% and 
33% of the average water bill, equivalent to a consumption from 50 to 63 
cubic meters (based on the district volumetric price). Most of them have 
implemented a two part pricing structure, with a frequent use of declining 
block rates (respectively 27%, 32%, 36% of the districts in each group). 
Increasing blocks and complex structures are implemented by 21% of 
districts of group 2, which often have a collective sewerage system and 
are characterised by a high level of seasonal population.  
Pricing policies implemented by districts of types 5 and 6 – which 
include all the district of population ranging between 10 000 and 100 000 
inhabitants (for type 5) and more than 100 000 (type 6) – are generally 
more simple: in both types, more than 80% use simple two part structure 
and only 18 and 17% have adopted block pricing. Pure volumetric 
structure has been adopted by respectively 9 and 13% of the districts. The 
level of fixed part is also much lower than in the first 3 groups: it 
corresponds on average to 7 and 10% of the average water bill. This 
reflects higher level of concern about efficiency of water use than slam 
districts have.  
Type 4, which corresponds to districts with a population between 3000 
and 10 000 inhabitants and low seasonal population, is in an intermediate 
position. Block pricing is implemented by 29% of the districts and the 
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fixed part represents 13% of the average water bill.  
3.4. Discussion 
Three main trends can be drawn from the survey. 
3.4.1. A current structure influenced by past. 
Current pricing structures are highly influenced by past pricing 
practices, in particular for small districts (500 and 3000 inhabitants) 
which had to abandon flat rate tariffs after the promulgation of the 1992 
French Water Law. A frequent situation concerns districts which were 
previously charging water with a fixed part (b) entailing the right to use a 
given volume of water (V) free of charge and a volumetric part (a) for all 
cubic meter exceeding the initial quota. After the 1992 water law, the 
quota was suppressed, the fixed part b was reduced to b’ and the first 
block v is now charged at a rate a’=[(b-b’)/V].  
3.4.2. A structure to recover (supply) costs. 
Supply cost recovery is the main objective that determines the choice 
of urban water pricing structure. As districts look for adjusting their water 
pricing structure to water and wastewater cost structure (which are mainly 
fixed), they usually adopt two-part structures. Only large utilities which 
can make economies of scale choose volumetric structures. 
 
Figure 2. Urban water pricing structures for interviewed districts according to their 
size 
Furthermore the fixed part is higher in small districts (Figure 2) and/or 
with a high seasonal population. And as the average price (calculated for 
120 cubic meter water consumption) is the same in districts with or 
without seasonal population, it shows that districts tend to adopt the urban 
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water pricing structure, which allows them to share costs in an equitable 
way between permanent and seasonal population. 
Moreover, the cost recovery objective justifies that small districts are 
more interested to establish the fixed part based on an individual basis 
(the flat when high seasonal fluctuations) rather than on a collective basis 
(like the meter or even the subscriber).  
Finally, this objective explains why districts facing households with 
their own water try to cover sewerage cost through a flat rate pricing. 
3.4.3. A structure to incite to consume water for outdoors uses. 
A frequently observed structure is the declining block rate (Figure 2), 
which provides incentives to consume water rather than to save it. 
However, since the median volume of the first block is 200 cubic meters, 
the second block is only used by households living in detached houses 
with gardens (and swimming pools). ‘Green’ tariffs proposed by one third 
of the French districts (no sewerage part charged for outdoor uses, 
metered separately from indoor uses) are also implemented to increase 
the total volume of water sales and increase cost recovery. 
Some concrete examples suggest that this type of pricing structure is 
chosen when water and wastewater network has been over-dimensioned, 
by anticipation of future water demand increase. It may also be 
implemented to reduce the profitability of alternative individual water 
supply strategies that households tend to develop when mains water is too 
expensive – in particular private boreholes construction (Montginoul, et 
al., 2005). 
On the contrary, none of the districts consulted have implemented a 
seasonal water pricing, a structure that can reduce water demand during 
peak periods and allow significant investment savings as network do not 
have to be oversized. This can be explained by the technical difficulties of 
implementing this structure in practice, in particular the need to read 
meters at least twice a year at the exact time of the rate change. 
Moreover, it must be understood by consumers to really reduce peak 
demand. A seasonal pricing can also cut peak consumption only if water 
demand is elastic to price. And, seasonal consumers, like tourists, are 
often assumed to be less sensitive to water price that inhabitants. Finally, 
a seasonal price can incite inhabitants to switch to other types of water, 
like groundwater or rainwater, something interesting for the district in 
terms of infrastructure dimension but dangerous in terms of water 
resource balance. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study points out the fact that current water and wastewater 
pricing structure is mainly explained by the past and by the objective of 
covering costs, at least the “supply cost” which is recovered, for urban 
water, at a level of 96% in the Seine-Normandie river basin (Fredefon and 
Laurans, 2004). That is why the two-part structure dominates and why 
declining block rates are frequently implemented, particularly in small 
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districts. This statement is however not true for the indirect costs which 
are (partly) covered by Water Agencies taxes with a volumetric rate 
structure (except for districts without water meters). 
If the new French water law proposal of May 2006 is voted following 
the WFD trends, many districts will have to adapt their pricing structures 
to generate more incentives to save water (increasing block rate, seasonal 
prices when high population fluctuations, etc.), in particular in water 
scarce areas. This change will not be easy to implement, especially when 
users (households, industries, etc.) have an access to an alternative water 
resource such as private tube-wells or rainwater recovery systems 
(Montginoul, et al., 2005). If the new water law proposal compels these 
users to install meters, it seems also necessary to incite water users to 
save all type of water (included “alternative waters” and in particular 
groundwater) and not only water from public water network.  
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